Reliable Behavioural Factors in the Information Security Context by Mayer, Peter et al.
Reliable Behavioural Factors in the Information Security
Context
Peter Mayer








SECUSO - Security, Usability, Society
Technische Universität Darmstadt




Users do often not behave securely when using information technol-
ogy. Many studies have tried to identify the factors of behavioural
theories which can increase secure behaviour. The goal of this work
is to identify which of the factors are reliably associated with secure
behaviour across multiple studies. Those factors are of interest to in-
formation security professionals since addressing them in security
awareness and education campaigns can help improving security
related processes of users. To attain our goal, we conducted a sys-
tematic literature review and assessed the reliability of the factors
based on the effect sizes reported in the literature. Our results indi-
cate that 11 out of the 14 factors from well established behavioural
theories can be associated with reliable effects in the information
security context. These factors cover very different aspects: influ-
ence of the users skills, whether the environment makes it possible
to exhibit secure behaviour, the influence of friends or co-workers,
and the perceived properties of the secure behaviour (e.g. response
cost). Also, we identify areas, where more studies are needed to
increase the confidence of the factors’ reliability assessment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Users do often not behave securely when using information tech-
nology (e.g. they do not check links before clicking them or do not
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perform backups regularly). This can raise severe security issues
and has led to users being referred to as the weakest link in the
security chain [40]. In many other contexts such as anti-smoking
campaigns [38] or pedestrian safety [19] researchers have studied
for many years which factors influence (in)adequate human be-
haviour. Actually, there is an entire research area on behavioural
theories. Theories that have been applied in many areas are for
instance Protection Motivation Theory [39] or Theory of Planned
Behaviour [1], but more specialized theories such as General Deter-
rence Theory [21] originating from criminology research exist. The
question, however, is which of the behavioural factors comprised
in these theories also apply in the information security context.
More recently, several of these theories have been evaluated
in information security (IS) research e.g. Protection Motivation
Theory in the context of anti-malware software use [6] or Theory
of Planned behaviour in the context of compliance with security
policies [36]. Some of the studied behavioural factors were shown to
have a significant influence on human behaviour in the IS context,
some in several studies, others only in some, and again others were
shown to have significant influence in different directions.
The goal of this work is to identify those behavioural factors
which exhibit reliable effects in the information security context
across different studies published in the literature. Note that we
use the term factor regardless of the nomenclature used in the
respective theories (e.g. factor, construct, technique, etc.).
To achieve this goal, we conducted a systematic literature review
of studies investigating the following behavioural theories which
have been studied in the IS context by several researchers: Pro-
tection Motivation Theory, Theory of Planned Behaviour, General
Deterrence Theory, and Technology Acceptance Model. In total,
these theories contain 14 behavioural factors.
Out of the 14 factors in our investigation, eleven factors seem to
be reliably associatedwith secure behaviour in the IS context, i.e. the
effect sizes of these factors are reliably beyond certain thresholds:
nine (namely self-efficacy, response cost, response efficacy, per-
ceived severity of threats, subjective norms, perceived behavioural
control, perceived certainty of sanctions, perceived severity of sanc-
tions, and perceived ease of use) are associated with a weak effect
(i.e. standardised effect size ≥ 0.1) and two (namely attitude and
perceived usefulness) are associated with a medium effect (i.e. stan-
dardised effect size ≥ 0.3). The remaining three factors cannot be
associated with reliable effects in the IS context.
While the two factors associated with reliable medium effects
might be the focus of attention for IS professionals, our results also
indicate the other the factors should not be disregarded to render











Figure 1: The Protection Motivation Theory with all its standard factors (white background) and the factors added later on
(grey background).
their efforts most effective. Additionally, we find that for some
factors the evidence is still scarce. In particular for the factors of
the General Deterrence Theory more studies are needed to increase
the confidence of the reliability assessment.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: First, we
present the necessary background for our investigation and in-
troduce the behavioural theories relevant for this work (section
2). Then, we describe the methodology applied to reach the goal
of this work (section 3). Thereafter, we present the results of our
systematic literature review, and assemble the set of reliable factors
from all factors evaluated in the literature (section 4). Then, we
discuss our methodology, our findings, the limitations of this work,
and implications for future research (section 5). Last but not least,
we summarise and conclude (section 6).
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we outline the background underlying this work.
First, we introduce the related work by Lebek et al. [34], which
served as starting point for our investigation. Then we describe the
theories and behavioural factors considered in our investigation.
2.1 Starting Point
Lebek et al. [34] present a comprehensive literature review of be-
havioural theories which were evaluated in the IS context. It was
conducted in 2013. Their goal was to identify those theories that
were studied most frequently in the IS context. In total, they found
54 theories which were studied; four of these were identified as be-
ing most frequently studied: Protection Motivation Theory (PMT),
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), General Deterrence Theory
(GDT), and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The goal of our
research is to assess the reliability of the behavioural factors com-
prised in these theories across the studies in published literature.
We decided to focus on these four theories to ensure multiple stud-
ies are available for our assessment. Therefore, we consider all the
papers identified by Lebek et al. [34] in their literature reviewwhich
investigate factors of these four theories. Additionally, we consider
literature studying one of the four theories that was published after
their original survey, as outlined in section 3. We decided to base
our work on the review of Lebek et al. [34] despite an alternative
by Sommestad et al. [44] being available due to two reasons. Firstly,
Sommestad et al. focus solely on compliance with security policies
and therefore exclude studies investigating important aspects of
IS-related behaviour usually not found in organisational security
policies (e.g. checking links before clicking on them), thereby ig-
noring the context of non-organisational IS. Secondly, Lebek et al.
searched for studies published in 2000 or later, while Sommestad et
al. only included publications from 2006 onward.
2.2 Description of the Behavioural Theories
In this section, we briefly present the four behavioural theories
included in our investigation (i.e. Protection Motivation Theory,
Theory of Planned Behaviour, General Deterrence Theory, and
Technology Acceptance Model). For each theory, we first describe
its overall concepts and then introduce all of its factors.
2.2.1 Protection Motivation Theory. Protection Motivation The-
ory (PMT) explains an individual’s reaction to warnings about
threats [39]. More formally termed, these warnings are called fear
appeals, which “are persuasive messages designed to scare people
by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they
do not do what the message recommends” [46].
PMT posits that the reaction is based on two appraisal processes,
the coping appraisal and the threat appraisal. The coping appraisal
process includes three factors contributing to an individual’s abil-
ity to cope with a threat, namely self-efficacy, response costs, and
response efficacy. In order to yield a positive coping appraisal (in
terms of protection motivation), self-efficacy and response efficacy
must outweigh the response costs. The second process, threat ap-
praisal, includes three factors as well: perceived severity of threats,
perceived vulnerability to the threat, and maladaptive rewards (also
termed benefits in some publications). These factors contribute to
an individual’s threat perception. In order to yield a positive threat
appraisal (in terms of protection motivation), the perceived severity
and vulnerability have to outweigh the maladaptive rewards.
Figure 1 depicts an overview of PMT with all its core factors and
the two factors fear and maladaptive rewards added later on [6].
One of the additional factors, fear, resides outside the two appraisal
processes and is considered to be a result of the threat appraisal
process. All factors are explained in the following.
Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy represents an individual’s perception
of her or his own ability to successfully exhibit a specific behaviour






Figure 2: The Theory of Planned Behaviour with all factors.
(in the context of PMT a specific coping action). In the IS domain, an
example might be whether a user is able to install security updates
for their operating system on their own. Vicarious experiences are
experiences made through observation and have been identified as
an antecedent to self-efficacy [4, 29].
Response Cost. The response costs include all costs associated
with performing a coping action. Examples for such costs can be
inconvenience incurred by performing the action (e.g. loss of pro-
ductivity) or actual material costs (e.g. monetary costs). In the IS
context, such response costs might be the time expenditure for
entering a password as part of a specific task.
Response Efficacy. The response efficacy refers to the belief
that a certain coping action will lead to the removal (or at least
a reduction) of the threat. In the IS context, an example might be
whether an individual believes that checking links in emails actually
prevents falling for phishing attacks.
Perceived Severity of Threats.The perceived severity of threats
refers to the magnitude of possible negative consequences a threat
can cause. In the context of IS, this might be the amount of lost
sensitive data during an unwanted disclosure event.
Perceived Vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the suscepti-
bility or likelihood of possible negative consequences if no coping
action is taken. In the IS context, this might refer to an individual’s
perception of the likelihood that she or he will become the victim
of a cyberscam.
Maladaptive Rewards. This factor comprises all aspects of in-
trinsic or extrinsic motivation arising from exposure to the threat.
In the IS context this might correspond to the amount of time an
individual saves when circumventing security procedures while
performing a task.
Fear. The perception of threats can lead to an unpleasant emo-
tional state: fear. Fear drives the individual to responses aiming
at decreasing the threat and in consequence also the fear arousal.
Thereby, it is important to note that even horrific messages must
not lead to the arousal of fear [3].
2.2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour. The Theory of Planned Be-
haviour (TPB) evolved from the Theory of Reasoned Action and
explains how individuals form behavioural intentions [1]. It is con-
sidered to be one of the most validated behavioural theories [34].
TPB includes three primary factors: attitude, subjective norms,
and perceived behavioural control. Figure 2 depicts an overview of
TPB and its factors.
Attitude. Attitude refers to an individual’s positive or negative
feelings towards and perceptions of a certain behaviour. It describes
the value of a behaviour for an individual. In the IS context, this
might refer to opinions about the usage of specific security software
or tools.
Subjective Norms. Subjective norms represent the perceived
behavioural expectations set by the individual’s environment (in
particular close peers or people with higher authority). In the IS
context, an example for a subjective norm might be whether it is
considered usual behaviour to lock devices when they are not in
use, even among peers.
Perceived Behavioural Control. The perceived behavioural
control traditionally integrates two components: an individual’s
self-efficacy (as also included in PMT) and the perceived controllabil-
ity. Controllability refers to an individual’s perception of available
resources and opportunities as well as situational support (the
degree of how favourable the environment is [29]) allowing the
individual to actually exhibit desired behaviour [34]. In the infor-
mation security context, an example covering all aspects of TPB’s
perceived behavioural control might be whether an individual has
both, the necessary privileges to install security software as well as
the confidence and knowledge to operate such software.
2.2.3 General Deterrence Theory. General Deterrence Theory
(GDT) stems from research on rational decision making. It was
originally developed in the field of criminology, but is now widely
adopted across different domains.
GDT posits that two factors, the perceived certainty of sanctions
and the perceived severity of sanctions, influence the deterrence
regarding an illicit act [14]. The higher both of these factors are,
the more individuals will be deterred from the act. Figure 3 depicts
an overview of GDT and its two factors.
Perceived Certainty of Sanctions. The perceived certainty
of sanctions refers to the likelihood, that an illicit act is followed
by sanctions (i.e. punishment). In the context of IS, this might be
the perception of an employee regarding monitoring of network
activity (and thus the detection of illicit traffic).
Perceived Severity of Sanctions. The perceived severity of
sanctions refers to the severity (i.e. magnitude) of sanctions which
follow an illicit act. In the context of IS, this might be whether an em-
ployee believes violations of the IS policy will have no consequences
or even result in the termination of the employee’s contract.














Figure 4: The Technology AcceptanceModel with its factors.
2.2.4 Technology Acceptance Model. The Technology Accep-
tance Model (TAM) explains an individual’s acceptance and usage
of technological systems [15].
TAM posits that usage of technology is influenced by an individ-
ual’s attitude towards the usage which in turn is influenced by two
factors: the perceived usefulness of the system and the perceived ease
of use [15]. Figure 4 depicts an overview of TAM and its factors.
Note that we only consider the original version of TAM since this
seems to be the one applied in IS research [34].
Perceived Usefulness. The perceived usefulness refers to an
individual’s subjective perception that using a specific system in-
creases her or his effectiveness with regard to a specific task. In the
IS context, this might be whether an IS tool actually solves an IS
problem in the individual’s workflow.
Perceived Ease of Use. The perceived ease of use refers to
an individual’s subjective perception of whether using a specific
system is free of effort. In the IS context, this might be whether an
IS tool requires additional steps, which the individual has to take,
before completing a task or whether it integrates with her or his
existing workflow seamlessly.
3 METHODOLOGY
The ultimate goal of this work is to identify factors of behavioural
theories that are reliably associated with an individual’s inten-
tion to perform secure IS-related behaviour. To achieve this goal,
we employ a three-step process. In the following we present our
methodology, outlining the procedures for each of these three steps.
First Step – Literature Review: Based on the results of Lebek
et al. [34], we decided to focus on those four behavioural theories
that were identified as being most frequently studied: Protection
Motivation Theory (PMT), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB),
General Deterrence Theory (GDT), and Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM). For the corresponding literature published before
2013, we rely on the papers identified by the literature review
of Lebek et al. [34]. In order to include research published since
their original review, we conducted a systematic literature review
of quantitative empirical studies evaluating any of those four be-
havioural theories in the IS context published since 2013. Thereby,
we adopted Lebek et al.’s methodology. We searched through the
ten databases AISeL, ScienceDirect, IEEEXplore, JSTOR, Springer-
Link, ACM,Wiley, Emerald, InformsOnline and Palgrave Macmillan
and included not only high-quality literature, but also literature
from smaller and less known sources. Note, detailed explanations
and justifications regarding the search methodology can be found
in the description of Lebek et al. in [34]. We adopted all search
terms (i.e. “security awareness”, “awareness training”, “awareness
program”, “awareness campaign”, “security education”, “security
motivation”, “security behavior” and “personnel security”) from
[34]. After eliminating all irrelevant search in the same way as
Lebek et al. [34] (non-academic publications such as white-papers
or incomplete description of methodology) 13 additional publica-
tions investigating behavioural theories were considered. Table 1
gives an overview of the results reported in the publications we
identified in our literature research.
Second Step – Identifying Relevant Literature: Next, we
filtered the studies we found in the first step. Lebek et al. [34]
focused on identifying which theories are studied in the IS context,
no matter whether they were applied to increasing secure IS-related
behaviour (e.g. checking links before clicking them) or to decrease
IS misuse (e.g. unauthorised modification of data). We, however,
explicitly focus on those factors which are reliably associated with
an individual’s intention to increase secure IS-related behaviour.
Consequently, we only included studies in our literature review
which investigated behavioural intention toward more secure IS-
related behaviour and excluded all those studies investigating the
effects of factors with relation to decreasing malicious behaviour
or IS misuse, since decreasing misuse does not necessarily imply
adopting more secure behaviour (e.g. factors stopping individuals
to illegally access patient records might not convince individuals
to check links before clicking them).
While table 1 in the appendix lists both types of studies and
which type they belong to, only those investigating effects on the
individual’s intention to increase secure IS-related behaviour are
considered in the third step. Additionally, all studies investigating
increasing secure IS-related behaviour use structural equation mod-
elling in their analysis and report path coefficients (which already
represent standardised effect sizes, termed β). Consequently, only
statistically significant results are considered, since non-significant
results for path coefficients cannot be sensibly interpreted. In the
following, we refer to the studies not sorted out in this step as
relevant studies.
Third Step – Identifying Reliable Factors: The final step is
identifying the reliable factors. The basis for this assessment are the
effect sizes reported in the relevant studies. Due to the non-linearity
of effect sizes, we will not present mean averages, but instead look
at the overall picture drawn by the effect sizes for each factor in our
investigation. Effect sizes will be interpreted as small (β ≥ 0.10),
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Figure 5: The effect sizes reported in the relevant studies for each of the factors in our investigation. The factorsmaladaptive
rewards and fear are not shown since no relevant studies were found in the literature review. PMT: Protection Motivation
Theory, SE: Self-efficacy, RC: Response Cost, RE: Response Efficacy, PSoT: Perceived Severity of Threats, PV: Perceived Vul-
nerability, TPB: Theory of Planned Behaviour, A: Attitude, SN: Subjective Norms, PBC: Perceived Behavioural Control, GDT:
General Deterrence Theory, PCoS: Perceived Certainty of Sanctions, PSoS: Perceived Severity of Sanctions, TAM: Technology
Acceptance Model, PU: Perceived Usefulness, PEoU: Perceived Ease of Use.
medium (β ≥ 0.30) or large (β ≥ 0.50), as suggested by Cohen [12]
for Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
4 RESULTS
Figure 5 gives an overview of the standardized effect sizes reported
in the literature for each of the factors in our investigation. Note that
some publications report on multiple studies (i.e. in the following,
the number of cited publications might be smaller than the number
of studies referred to) and not all studies include all factors of the
theories they are investigating (i.e. the number of relevant studies
can vary between the factors). In the following, whenever we refer
to an individual’s behavioural intention to increase secure IS-related
behaviour, we use the shortened form BI.
4.1 Protection Motivation Theory
Self-efficacy. Three studies [5, 13] investigating the effect of self-
efficacy on BI could be found in the literature review. All three show
small effects (0.190 ≤ β ≤ 0.296), drawing a relatively clear picture.
Therefore, our investigation indicates a reliable weak positive effect
for self-efficacy on BI in the IS context.
Response Cost. The results for the response cost draw a similar
picture. Four relevant studies investigating this factor could be
identified in the literature review, resulting in a range of effect sizes
of −0.142 ≤ β ≤ −0.675. Three of the four studies [6, 13] indicated
a weak negative effect and one [6] reports a large negative effect.
Therefore, our investigation indicates a reliable weak negative effect
of response cost on BI in the IS context (i.e. response cost correlates
with a decreased BI).
Response Efficacy. Four relevant studies investigating the ef-
fect of response efficacy on BI could be found in the literature
review. All reported a positive relationship. The resulting range of
effect sizes is 0.060 ≤ β ≤ 0.310. While one study [41] failed to
meet the threshold for a weak effect, a funnel plot also indicated
that it represented an outlier in the available data. Of the other
studies, one reported a medium effect [5] and five reported a weak
effect [6, 13, 27, 28]. Overall, our investigation therefore indicates a
weak positive reliable effect for response efficacy on BI.
Perceived Severity of Threats. Five relevant studies from the
literature research investigate the effect of the perceived severity
of threats on BI. Four of those [5, 6, 13] report a weak positive
effect (0.120 ≤ β ≤ 0.276). In contrast, only one [27] indicates a
weak negative effect (β = −0.200). However, this study [27] has a
relatively low number of participants and the study appeared as
an outlier in a funnel plot. Thus, our investigation suggests a weak
positive reliable effect for the perceived severity of threats on BI in
the IS context.
Perceived Vulnerability. Overall, two studies investigating
the relationship between perceived vulnerability and BI could be
found in our own literature research and in the literature review of
Lebek et al. [34]. One indicates a weak positive effect [13], the other
indicates a positive relationship, but fails to reach the threshold
for the weak effect [27]. Therefore, our investigation indicates a
non-reliable positive effect for the perceived vulnerability on BI.
Maladaptive Rewards. None of the studies investigating mal-
adaptive rewards held significant results. Thus, no assessment of
its effects is possible.
Fear. Analogously to the maladaptive rewards, none of the stud-
ies investigating fear held significant results. Thus, no assessment
of its effects is possible as well.
4.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour
Attitude. All relevant studies investigating the effect of attitude on
BI show a positive relationship [2, 7–9, 16–18, 26, 27, 36, 49]. The
overall range of effect sizes is 0.180 ≤ β ≤ 0.537. Six show a weak
effect, four a medium effect, and one a large effect. Therefore, our
investigation indicates a reliable medium positive effect for attitude
on BI in the IS context.
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Subjective Norms. From the fourteen relevant studies investi-
gating the effect of subjective norms on BI, thirteen report a positive
effect, resulting in a range of 0.190 ≤ β ≤ 0.450. Eight report a
weak positive effect [2, 9, 18, 27, 28, 31, 35, 36] and five a medium
positive effect [16, 23, 24, 26, 42]). In contrast, only one study [10]
reports a weak negative effect (β = −0.139). This negative effect
is the smallest effect of all those reported in the literature. There-
fore, our investigation suggests a reliable weak positive effect for
subjective norms on BI in the IS context.
Perceived Behavioural Control. Fourteen relevant studies in-
vestigated the effect of TPB’s perceived behavioural control (PBC).
Thereby, some studies investigated only one of PBC’s components
(i.e. self-efficacy or controllability) and some studies investigated
PBC as a whole, not distinguishing between the two components.
Six relevant studies investigated PBC’s effect on BI as a whole.
All studies showed positive effects. Three [16, 17] found a weak
positive effect and three [26, 35, 49] found a medium positive effect
(0.160 ≤ β ≤ 0.430). One study [16] also indicated a medium effect
of self efficacy on PBC (β = 0.390). Two studies [16, 17] indicate a
weak effect of Controllability on PBC (β = 0.208 and β = 0.290).
Eight relevant studies investigated the effect of self-efficacy on BI
(instead of the whole PBC construct). Seven [2, 9, 18, 24, 27, 28, 42]
report a weak effect and one [41] reports a medium effect, resulting
in an overall range of 0.100 ≤ β ≤ 0.310. One relevant study [18]
investigated the effect of Controllability on BI (instead of the whole
construct), indicating a weak effect (β = 0.130).
Overall, our investigation indicates the consistency of the PBC
and its two components self-efficacy and controllability. It suggests
for PBC and its components a weak reliable effect on BI.
4.3 General Deterrence Theory
Perceived Certainty of Sanctions. Two relevant studies [23, 24]
investigate the effect of the perceived certainty of sanctions on BI.
Both report a weak positive effect (β = 0.155 and β = 0.260). Thus,
our investigation indicates a reliable weak positive effect for the
perceived certainty of sanctions on BI in the IS context.
Perceived Severity of Sanctions. The same two relevant stud-
ies [23, 24] reporting on the perceived certainty of sanctions, also
report on the effect of the perceived severity of sanctions. Both
show a weak negative effect (β = −0.139 and β = −0.209). There-
fore, our investigation indicates a reliable weak negative effect on
BI in the IS context.
4.4 Technology Acceptance Model
Perceived Usefulness. Six relevant studies investigating the per-
ceived usefulness were identified in the literature review. Five in-
vestigate the effect on the individual’s attitude. Three of those
[16, 17, 47] report a large effect (0.500 ≤ β ≤ 0.520) and two
[16, 22] report a weak effect (β = 0.270 and β = 0.298). Since
both weak effects are very close to the medium effect threshold
of β ≥ 0.30 and the majority of effects are large, we argue that
our investigation indicates the a reliable medium positive effect for
perceived usefulness on BI in the IS context.
The one remaining study [31] investigates the effect of perceived
usefulness on BI and reports a weak positive effect (β = 0.150).
Perceived Ease of Use. Overall, three relevant studies investi-
gated the perceived ease of use. Two of these [16, 47] investigated
its effect on BI, both reporting weak positive effects (β = 0.260 and
β = 0.286). Therefore, our investigation indicates a reliable weak
effect of perceived ease of use on BI in the IS context.
The remaining study [31] investigated the effect of perceived
ease of use on BI and reported a positive relationship, but failed to
meet the threshold of a weak effect. However, [31] only investigated
the indirect effect of the perceived ease of use on BI.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Reliable Factors
We find that 11 out of the 14 behavioural factors included in our
investigation are – according to our assessment – reliably asso-
ciated with secure IS-related behaviour. However, the majority
of these factors (nine out of eleven) exhibit mostly weak effects.
Namely these are: “self-efficacy”, “response cost”, “response effi-
cacy”, “perceived severity of threats”, “subjective norms”, “perceived
behavioural control”, “perceived certainty of sanctions”, “perceived
severity of sanctions”, and “perceived ease of use”. Only the two
factors “attitude” and “perceived usefulness” can be associated with
reliable medium effects. This indicates that these two should be
of particular interest to anyone wishing to evoke more secure IS-
related behaviour. However, while the two factors associated with
reliable medium effects might be the focus of attention, the other
factors should not be disregarded. IS professionals should always
keep all of the reliable factors in mind as to render their efforts
most effective. In particular, ignoring one of the factors associated
with reliable effects completely could render any effort to increase
secure IS-related behaviour futile (e.g. fear appeals might not lead
to more secure behaviour, if the self-effficacy of employees is low).
Additionally, we find that in particular three of the factors asso-
ciated with reliable effects (i.e. perceived severity of threats, subjec-
tive norms, and perceived severity of sanctions) would benefit from
additional studies being available in the literature to increase the
confidence of their assessment. For “perceived severity of threats”,
the effect sizes reported in the literature rendered an assessment
difficult: one study reported a weak negative effect size, while all
other studies indicated a weak positive effect. While the negative
effect seems to be an outlier, more studies would help to assess this
factor’s reliability with greater confidence. The same issue with con-
flicting directions for the effect sizes arose for “subjective norms”,
albeit to a much lesser extent. Since the number of relevant studies
in the literature was much greater for this factor (14 for subjective
norms vs. 5 for perceived severity of threats), the assessment could
be made with much greater confidence. For the “perceived severity
of sanctions” a different issue arose: we found effects which are
inverse of what could be expected (i.e. a negative effect instead of a
positive effect). This indicates that more severe sanctions lead to
less secure IS-related behaviour. While unintuitive at first glance,
we argue that this might represent a known phenomenon [25],
where excessively severe sanctions do not have a repelling effect,
but instead medium sanctions are more appropriate. The items in
the respective studies (i.e. [23, 24]) mention employees being ter-
minated after IS violations without any indication of what type of
violation is meant (e.g. disclosing company secret data to the public
Reliable Behavioural Factors in the Information Security Context ARES ’17, August 29-September 01, 2017, Reggio Calabria, Italy
vs. sending an unencrypted email). Therefore, it might be that this
phenomenon was observed in the respective studies. More research
is needed to determine the true influence of this phenomenon in
the IS context and give greater confidence in the assessment.
5.2 Excluded Factors
Three of the factors in our investigation (all being part of PMT)
proved not to be reliable in the IS context: “perceived vulnerability”,
“maladaptive rewards”, and “fear”. For the “maladaptive rewards”
no study in our literature review reported significant path coeffi-
cients. Consequently, no assessment of its effect is possible. More
research investigating this factor is required to determine what
effect (however small it may be) this factor has in the IS context.
The exclusion of the “perceived vulnerability” as non-reliable
means that only the threat and its consequences seem to be relevant
(represented by the three factors “perceived severity of threats”,
“perceived certainty of sanctions” and “perceived severity of sanc-
tions”) in the IS context. In contrast, how vulnerable an individual
is to these threats seems to plays no role. We believe this to be a
surprising finding. While the factor is non-reliable, the direction of
the relationship is (as one would expect) positive. However, since
only two relevant studies were found in the literature research, ad-
ditional evidence from future studies could increase the confidence
of the assessment.
While none of the studies investigating fear as a factor for PMT
reported significant results, an interesting observation comes from
the studies of Boss et al. [6] who included fear in their model.
When they only considered their high fear appeal condition in the
analysis, all PMT factors became significant. Thus, a more thorough
investigation of this factor might offer valuable insights.
5.3 Limitations
We only included studies in our literature reviewwhich investigated
behavioural intention toward more secure IS-related behaviour and
and excluded all those studies investigating the effects of factors
with relation to decreasing IS misuse. We argue that these two
contexts (i.e. increasing secure IS-related behaviour and IS mis-
use) should be treated separately in investigations such as this
work. However, the overall low number of studies investigating be-
havioural factors in the context of IS misuse in the literature review
did not allow for a separate evaluation of the factors with respect
to this context. Thus, studies investigating the effect of behavioural
factors in the context of IS misuse might be valuable additions to
the available literature.
The number of relevant studies for each of the 14 factors in our
investigation varied greatly. Especially for TAM’s “perceived ease
of use”, Protection Motivation Theory’s “perceived vulnerability”,
as well as General Deterrence Theory’s two factors “perceived
certainty of sanctions” and “perceived severity of sanctions” only
two relevant studies were found in the literature research. For
GDT most studies seem to be placed in the context of IS misuse.
Thus their exclusion decreased the number of available studies
investigating GDT substantially from six to two. This of course
adds uncertainty to the assessment of reliability. While we believe
that our assessments are sound when considering the available
evidence, further studies investigating these factors would allow
an assessment with greater confidence.
An issue in systematic literature reviews is a general tendency
that significant and positive results get published more often than
insignificant or negative results. This publication bias affects all
literature reviews and cannot be prevented methodologically. Fun-
nel plots are a possibility to check whether this bias affects the
data collected in a systematic literature review [32]. An inspection
of funnel plots for all factors in our study revealed only very few
outliers, implying a low publication bias.
Basing our investigation on the work of Lebek et al. [34], we only
included the most frequently studied theories identified by them.
Other theories might offer further insights and provide additional
reliable factors. However, less popular and less frequently studied
behavioural theories and factors are likely to have the problem of
scarcity of relevant studies investigating these factors. Therefore
we argue, that they are less valuable in works like this which are
focusing on reliability across multiple studies. In particular, all the
further factors (cf. Table 1, category Further Factors) which were
included by numerous studies, but which are not part of established
theories were excluded in our investigation due to the scarcity of
relevant studies and subtle differences in the factors’ definitions.
Also, while we employed the same rigorous process for our
literature review as Lebek et al. [34], the same limitations apply.
For instance, non-peer-reviewed publications such as whitepapers
were excluded. While we argue this increases the overall quality of
our results, it might also mean that we missed valid results.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we identify factors from behavioural theories which
are associated with reliable effects on individuals intention to in-
crease secure IS-related behaviour. Thereby, we enable IS profes-
sionals to appropriate the most influential factors for future efforts
to direct users towards more secure behaviour. This renders the
design of appropriate awareness and education materials much
more efficient.
Our discussion of this work’s findings outlines several areas
where further research is needed to increase the confidence of
reliability assessments of some of the behavioural factors in our
investigation. In addition, we see two directions of future work.
Firstly, our findings should be applied to design and create appro-
priate IS awareness and education materials, allowing a subsequent
validation of the identified set of reliable factors. When designing
awareness materials (e.g. in the form of teasing texts or slogans),
it might be possible to maximise their effectiveness by addressing
the different reliable factors with appropriate wordings in the ma-
terials. These texts and slogans could be created for various topics
(e.g. password security, privacy settings, etc.), enabling the easy
deployment of awareness campaigns by IS professionals covering
all these topics.
Secondly, research has identified several reasons users voice as
justification for insecure behaviour in qualitative studies (e.g. [33,
43, 45]). Volkamer et al. [45] provide a broad overview of 17 different
such reasons for insecure behaviour, formulating their model of
precaution adoption. Investigating which reliable factors can be
used to address which of the reasons in their model most effectively
ARES ’17, August 29-September 01, 2017, Reggio Calabria, Italy
could give IS professionals an additional tool to optimise their IS
awareness and education efforts through formulations targeting
specific reasons with the most appropriate factors.
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